Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy
This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.
Arms control is a strategy by governments to overcome the security dilemma by institutionalized cooperation. It comes in three versions: arms control proper, with stability as main objective; non-proliferation as a sub-category of arms control, so understood with the main objective to preserve the distributive status quo concerning certain weapon types; and disarmament with the objective to eliminate a specific weapon type. Confidence building is a cross-cutting functional concept, lumping together many different measures that can serve all three versions
Arms control does not reject self-help as a basis of national security, but entrusts a significant piece of it to cooperation with potential enemies. Hence, arms control—with the exception of unilateral, hegemonic arms control imposed on others, and non-proliferation, for preserving an existing oligopoly—is a difficult subject for realism and neorealism, but also for post-modernism. It presents a solvable puzzle for rationalists and no problem at all for constructivists, who can dig into norms, discourses, and identities.
Concerning stability and change, arms control can be looked at from two opposing perspectives. Because the aim is stability, critical security approaches have labeled it as a conservative, status quo-orientated strategy. But there is also a transformational perspective: arms control as a vehicle to induce and re-inforce a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between states. Naturally, the concept of disarmament shows the greatest affinity to the transformational perspective.
A related issue is whether arms control is a result of political circumstances, a dependent variable with no political impact of its own, or whether it has causal effect on interstate relations. Constructivism proposes a dialectical relationship in which arms control and broader policy influence each other. From this reflection, the questions of the conditions of success and failure flow naturally. Conducive interstate relations (or “extrinsic shocks”), technology, domestic structures, learning, leadership, perception, and ideology have been candidates for the “independent master variable.”
Three models tackle the relation of arms control and historical time. The first model is the enlightenment intuition of steady progress. The second model is a series of waves, each of which leaves the world in a more cooperative state than the previous one. The final model is the circle: arms control ebbs and floods alternately, but achievements are fully lost in each ebb period.
We can distinguish four arms control discourses. First, arms control as the maiden of deterrence. Second, arms control subordinated to defense needs. Third, arms control under the imperative of disarmament. Fourth, arms control as the instrument of human security, the survival and well-being of human individuals, notably civilians.
As with all politics, arms control involves justice issues: the distribution of values (security/power), access to participation in decision making, and the granting of recognition as legitimate actor. Arms control negotiations are ripe with justice claims, and failure through incompatible justice demands happens frequently. Also, emotions play a key role: frustration and ensuing resentment, anger and existential fear can prevent success. Finally, compassion, empathy, and trust are ingredients in successful arms control processes.