Role Contestation in Making Foreign Policy Decisions: Digraph and Game Theory Models
This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.
The concept of role contestation has emerged within the recent renaissance of role theory in foreign policy analysis, which has taken hold among international relations scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Role contestation is a novel theoretical perspective on the process of role location that complements the more traditional processes of role strain, role competition, and role conflict identified earlier by the role theory literature in the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis. It refers to the process that occurs within states as their decision units debate and decide what role to select in relations with another state in the regional or global international system. The process of horizontal role contestation occurs among elites inside the government, while the process of vertical role contestation occurs between elites and interest groups outside the government. These role contestation processes can also extend to interactions before and after a foreign policy decision.
Role contestation processes are part of a larger process of role location that refers to various stages of evolution and transition in the enactment of role and counter-role between ego and alter as states construct role conceptions, exchange cues, and adapt to structural role demands in their respective decision-making environments. The focus in this essay is limited to the analysis of horizontal role contestation as a causal mechanism that describes and explains how the foreign policy decision-making process among elites leads to foreign policy decisions. Digraph models represent the process of debate among elites as they deliberate over the selection of ends and means prior to making a foreign policy decision. Game theory models represent how the decision is likely to be carried out as a strategy of role enactment. Illustrative applications of this two-stage modeling strategy are taken from recent research into Britain’s appeasement decisions in the late 1930s.