Austria was occupied at the end of World War II by the four Allies, but in contrast to Germany the four powers left in 1955—the condition being its declaration of permanent neutrality, on which the Soviet Union had insisted.
In the first half of the 1950s, relations with the new-founded European Coal and Steel Community were being discussed in Austria, because the organization encompassed Austria’s two most important trading partners at that time, West Germany and Italy. But after the uprising in October-November 1956 in neighboring Hungary, Austria started to stress more its neutrality, excluding European Economic Community (EEC) membership. Instead, it joined other European countries to create a less integrated economic entity, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960.
Not until the mid-1980s did debate about membership in the now European Community (EC) start again. Economic problems and a narrower interpretation of neutrality led to Austria’s application for EC (later European Union) membership in July 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the application of other EFTA countries, Austria finally acceded to the EU on January 1, 1995 (along with Finland and Sweden). The political system and its economy adjusted relatively smoothly to the challenges of EU membership; the “social partnership,” while losing some of its power, could maintain its influence on Austrian politics. Eastern enlargement of the EU brought further economic advantages for Austria.
As one of the smaller EU countries and a non-NATO member, Austria has a somewhat unique position in the EU. Environmental policy and supporting EU membership of the Balkan countries are among the important “niches” for Austrian EU activities. But the country has no close partners in the EU, because it is not participating in the “Visegrad” cooperation of the other Central European EU members. This difficulty clearly showed during the “sanctions” period of the EU-14 against the new Austrian government in 2000.
Dictatorships have dominated global politics for hundreds of years, from the pharaohs of Egypt to the absolute monarchs of Europe. Though democracy has since spread to much of the world, about a third of today’s countries are still ruled by dictatorship. And yet, compared to democracies, we know very little about how dictatorships work, who the key political actors are, and where decision-making powers lie. Political processes are opaque, and information is often intentionally distorted. Political survival depends not on maintaining the favor of voters, as in democracies, but on securing the backing of a considerably smaller coalition of supporters. The absence of a reliable third party to enforce compromises among key players means that power-sharing deals lack credibility and the threat of forced ouster is omnipresent. Uncertainty pervades authoritarian politics.
Modern autocrats respond to this uncertain environment in a variety of ways. They use political parties, legislatures, elections, and other institutions typically associated with democracies to lessen their risk of overthrow. Despite the façade of democracy, these institutions are key components of most autocrats’ survival strategies; those that incorporate them last longer in power than those that do not. The specific ways in which autocratic institutions are used and the extent to which they can constrain leadership choices to prevent consolidation of power into the hands of a single individual, however, vary enormously from one dictatorship to the next. Better understanding the conditions that push autocracies down a path of collegial versus strongman rule remains a critical task, particularly given that the latter is associated with more war, economic mismanagement, and resistance to democratization.
Integration with the European Union (EU) has been far less distressing for the three Baltic States than for numerous other accessing countries. Soon after regaining their independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had a strong societal impetus to (re)join Western political, economic, and legal culture. The accession of the three states, however, had several distinctive features related to constitutional background and settings. This has been an influencing factor when the governments tried to solve collisions with the EU institutions.
In general, the endless and controversial issues regarding how to solve the problems with supranational power have never been dramatic when referring to the Baltic States, which leads to the assumption that the governments have often taken the obeying position, trying to avoid heretical approaches. Somewhat surprisingly, it brought a reverse effect. Respecting the supranational character of the governments’ mainstream policies, but denying the interpretative pluralism of European values and norms, they have been “overplayed” by other member states and the power institutions of the EU, which often acted more deliberatively and implemented European directives rather critically. Latest cases, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism, indicate the change in paradigm—the three Baltic States are more aware of the margin of appreciation and the actual borderlines of policy and decision making. There is a tendency to have more open and inclusive discussions to avoid discontent with the stakeholders of the countries’ societies. This may also be related to certain “taking offence,” of not being appreciated as successful states following the ultra-austerity doctrine during the economic crisis, and the increasing need for societal support when unpopular choices have to be enforced.
Today, there are more skills in finding allies and choosing the partners when trying to set up an EU-related agenda, for example, in relation to refugee quotas to the Member States. Still, the so-called “community method” has been a prevailing political doctrine, illustrated, for example, by the favorable approach to the Lisbon Treaty in its several stages.
One interesting factor is linked with the establishment of high-speed digital service in the European Union and digital divide. For example, the small Baltic state of Estonia introduced the flagship initiative of e-Governance (e-Residence). While not so influential in the past, Estonia may influence the future, with initiatives such as digital marketing and e-Citizenry. There are interesting discussions about whether the EU should allow the single, tiny state of Estonia to shine the light for other member states, or should they ignore the steps taken, to avoid even further the increasing digital divide in the European Union.
Another interesting aspect in the contemporary world is the (inter)relationship of Europe with Russia. Here, the Baltic States play a relevant role, being spokesmen against the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, which created uneasy situations for the prudent European Union that was carefully framing foreign policy on the basis of (hardly achieved) consensus. By identifying themselves as a bridge between East and West, the Baltics have been active in Eastern Partnership and Development Aid initiatives.
Coalitions are observed frequently in parliamentary systems. It is known that about 70% of all governments in post-War Europe have been one type of coalition or another. Israel has never been ruled by a single-party government in its history. Recently, majoritarian systems like Britain have produced coalitions, which took many by surprise.
The prominence of coalitions in parliamentary democracies compels researchers to study them more closely, often contrasting them with single-party governments. For a long time, Comparative Politics literature has investigated the dynamics of coalition formation and termination, as well as their domestic policy outputs. Studies find that coalitions impede the efficient production of public policy and lead to higher levels of corruption when compared to governments ruled by a single political party. Coalitions also diffuse responsibility among the governing parties, allowing them to avoid electoral punishment.
Coalitions generated interest on the international relations front as well. One avenue of research transcended the political party as a building block and conceptualized coalitions as a decision unit by focusing on the group of veto players in a regime’s foreign policy apparatus. This line of inquiry establishes that coalitions often result in deadlocks, thus rendering them inefficient actors in world affairs. A second line of scholarship looked at the effect of coalitions on the likelihood of international conflict. Situated in the framework of Democratic Peace, this literature tests the effect of multi-party governance to identify the domestic-institutional explanations behind the war behavior of democracies.
More recent research in the field of foreign policy analysis significantly departs from the Democratic Peace tradition. This avenue of scholarship accomplishes three things. First, it encourages theory development. Rather than taking a straightforward, variable-oriented approach, the literature of coalition foreign policy develops theoretical explanations for why coalitions behave differently than single parties in the international arena. Second, this literature bridges the gap between international relations and comparative politics by bringing the political party back into the theoretical underpinnings of foreign policy decision making. To this end, researchers dissect coalitions by studying, among other things, the effects of their size, ideological cohesion, and practices of portfolio allocation on how they make and implement foreign policies. Recent research takes a micro-foundational view by focusing on the dynamics of designing the government’s foreign policy roadmap in the formation stage. Finally, this literature illustrates the merits of methodological plurality in studying foreign policy. Using a combination of comparative case studies, process tracing, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), and regression modeling, this body of work sheds light not only on the broader trends that characterize coalition foreign policy but also on the causal mechanisms and contextual factors that often go unaccounted for in statistical analysis. Multi-method approaches also improve existing theories on coalition politics and foreign policy, particularly those pertaining to responsibility diffusion, veto players, junior party hijacking, and diversion. Recent advances in role and image theories in Foreign Policy Analysis will likely spill over to the study of coalitions and their foreign policies, offering an interpretivist take alongside this positivist trajectory.
Ever since Aristotle, the comparative study of political regimes and their performance has relied on classifications and typologies. The study of democracy today has been influenced heavily by Arend Lijphart’s typology of consensus versus majoritarian democracy. Scholars have applied it to more than 100 countries and sought to demonstrate its impact on no less than 70 dependent variables. This paper summarizes our knowledge about the origins, functioning, and consequences of two basic types of democracy: those that concentrate power and those that share and divide power. In doing so, it will review the experience of established democracies and question the applicability of received wisdom to new democracies.
Scholarship on the relationship between domestic institutions and foreign policy is driven by the simple assumption that a state’s domestic political arrangement can explain important aspects of its foreign policy behavior. Democratic domestic institutions, in particular, are thought to be significant for explaining an important set of outcomes ranging from greater trade to the lack of war between mature democracies—the so-called Democratic Peace.
The study of the impact of democratic domestic institutions on foreign policy has developed along two broad lines. The first and most established approach is rooted in the basic distinction between democracies and non-democracies. In this view, democratic institutions—nearly universal franchise, regular and contested elections, et cetera—constrain leaders in a way that produces distinct democratic foreign policy patterns. Research shows, for example, that democracies cooperate with each other more often (and are also are more likely to uphold their commitments); face greater audience costs and thus make more effective threats; tend not to fight wars with each other (but do fight non-democracies quite frequently); and more often win the wars in which they are involved.
This approach has yielded a tremendous amount of research and insight into democratic foreign policy, but also suffers from several important critiques. One is that democracy tends to be correlated with a host of other variables, making it difficult to specify what exactly it is about democracy that explains certain foreign policy outcomes. A second and related critique is that this approach tends to treat democracy uniformly when in fact there is often great variation in democratic domestic institutions across cases.
In response to these challenges, a second approach has emerged in recent years that focuses on the differences among democracies and seeks to explain how this variation in turn creates variation in foreign policy behavior. Democracies differ in terms of their underlying institutional arrangements in a variety of ways, including whether they have presidential or parliamentary systems, proportional representation or single-member districts, strong or weak states, autonomous or constrained executives, and open or closed institutions to modulate the flow of information between leaders and citizens, among others. Even within a single democratic country, there can be a different set of institutional constraints depending on the given foreign policy instrument a leader seek to employ. Studying these variations and their impact on policy processes and outcomes provides great promise for further understanding the relationship between domestic democratic institutions and foreign policy.
Diplomacy’s role in foreign policy is hampered by multiple understandings of what diplomacy is and does. A broad definition of diplomacy holds that it encompasses more than the promotion of peaceful international relations. Instead, it is the sum of those relations—peaceful, hostile, and everything in between. Thus, foreign relations—so long as they involve the interests, direction, and actions of a sovereign power—may be regarded as synonymous with diplomatic relations, whereby foreign policy relates to the theory and practice of setting diplomatic priorities, planning for contingencies, advancing strategic, operational, and tactical diplomatic aims, and adjusting those aims to domestic and foreign constraints. This conception of diplomacy is a functional one: it emphasizes the roles of diplomats, and recognizes that many others, besides official envoys, perform these roles; and it illustrates that diplomatic settings—and the means, methods, and tools of diplomacy—undergo continuous change. The basic mediating purpose of diplomacy, however, has endured, as has much of its institutional apparatus—embassies, ambassadors, treaties, and so on. This is likely to remain so for as long as there are multiple polities in the world, all having to relate to one another.
While some women have been successful in promoting a feminist agenda in parliament, the research shows that this is not always a realistic expectation of women. Parliaments, as institutions, have specific cultural norms and practices, some of which actively work against women’s ability to advance gender equality. Understanding the conditions under which women—and men—parliamentarians might be successful in promoting gender equality outcomes has become an important avenue for research and development practice. The focus on gender-sensitive parliaments allows for a framework to identify and encourage the development of those conditions.
There are four key elements of a gender-sensitive parliament. First, it accepts that the responsibility to achieve gender equality, both as a policy outcome and as a process, rests with the parliament as a whole—its male and female Members and staff—and with the organizations that drive substantial policy development: political parties. Second, a gender-sensitive parliament is guided by overarching policies and legal frameworks, which allow the parliament to monitor its achievements towards gender equality and allow for follow up and review. Third, a gender-sensitive parliament institutionalizes a gender mainstreaming approach through its plenary debates, question sessions, committees, and caucuses to ensure that all policy and legislative reviews interrogate any potential discrimination against women or men, girls or boys. Finally, a gender-sensitive parliament fosters a culture of respect for women and their right to be an equal member of parliament.
Mikael Rask Madsen and Mikkel Jarle Christensen
Over the past several decades scholars have intensively debated what factors drive globalization. Answers have ranged from the emergence of the information society and the global economy to value-conflicts embedded in different civilizations. A different yet closely related question is who is driving globalization? That is, however, much less studied, even if it is arguably key to making global governance intelligible. A whole list of actors seem to offer possible answers to the question of who the globalizers are: Are they global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Criminal Court (ICC); communities of experts providing technocratic solutions; transnational networks of activists seeking to alter global and national politics by pursuing, for example, environmental or human rights agendas; or are they powerful individuals forming transnational elites taking the fate of the global society in their hands at a safe distance from ordinary politics in places such as Brussels, New York, or Davos?
Going public is the preeminent governing strategy of modern presidents. When presidents go public, they attempt to influence the decisions, actions, and opinions of others through speechmaking and other public engagement. Although some scholars of the rhetorical presidency show how presidents have used speeches to govern since the dawn of American democracy, the bulk of scholarship centers on the modern presidency, as both advances in communications technologies and changes in federal policymaking institutions spurred presidents to go public.
Going public as a leadership strategy involves a variety of presidential speeches designed to reach a range of institutions and actors. Strategies include going local, speaking on national television, or saturating news coverage by sustaining attention to a top priority. The president’s target audience can be Congress, the public, news media, or bureaucracy. Presidents have had some success going public, although the ways in which presidents have been successful vary by strategy and target audience.
Going public is more than just presidential leadership of others. It is also about what incentivizes the president’s efforts to use speeches to govern in the first place. Thus, a second focus of research on going public is what explains speechmaking and the tendency of presidents to respond to those institutions and actors that they also attempt to lead. The majority of existing research centers on presidential leadership of, and responsiveness to, mass public opinion, but the emergence of a more polarized public may influence why presidents go public and may change what political scientists conclude concerning going public and presidential leadership in a more polarized political age.