Doh Chull Shin
How well do people around the world understand democracy? Do they support democracy with an informed understanding of what it is? To address these questions, which have largely been overlooked in the literature on democratization, the World Values Survey and three regional barometer surveys are analyzed according to a two-dimensional notion of democratic knowledge. Their analyses reveal that a vast majority of global citizenries especially in post-authoritarian and authoritarian countries are either uninformed or misinformed about the fundamental characteristics of democracy and its alternatives. These findings contradict the popular theses that democracy is emerging as a universal value and it is also becoming the universally preferred system of government. For much of the world today, democracy represents little more than an appealing political symbol that still retains authoritarian practices.
This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Please check back later for the full article.
Referendums are frequently used by the European Union (EU) to ratify EU-related propositions. There are three main types of referendums: (a) on joining (or leaving) the EU, (b) ratification of new EU treaties or agreements, and (c) advisory referendums on particular EU-related issues, like whether Turkey should join the EU. While referendums have been widely criticized as being decided by ”second-order” factors such as governmental popularity, there is evidence that, when a proposition matters for voters, voting behavior is dominated by issue-voting. However, even when issue-voting dominates in high salience referendums, there is also evidence that voters hold a status-quo bias; and in instances where a vote is close, voter dispositions to keep what they know instead of opting for more unsure gains can tip the balance towards a no vote. In lower salience referendums, party cues and recommendations play a significant role.
When referendums are close, campaign effects and the importance of information provided by campaigns matter. Information and debates can make an issue salient for voters and can provide sufficient information to enable the voters to match voting intention with their underlying EU attitudes. However, not all voters react to campaign information in the same fashion. For example, pro-EU information can make voters with negative EU atittudes even more prone to vote no, whereas voters with positive EU attitudes are not as strongly motivated.
In the past several years, most EU referendums have resulted in negative outcomes. There have been negative outcomes in low salience referendums in countries like the Netherlands, where there is evidence that second-order factors mattered. In contrast, in the December 2015 referendum in Denmark on transforming the Danish opt-out into an opt-in on Justice and Home Affairs, Danes decided based on their EU attitudes (issue-voting). In particular, opponents of more integration were more highly motivated, pushing the outcomes towards a clear no. In June 2016, a majority of British voters decided to leave the EU based on their negative attitudes towards the EU, in particular because of economic and identity-based fears about the downside of EU membership relating to immigration and sovereignty.
Role theory first emerged as an approach to the study of foreign policy with the seminal work of Holsti, who argued that decision makers’ conceptions of their state’s role on the world stage influenced that state’s foreign policy behavior. Holsti’s approach was ahead of its time. The potential of role theory to contribute to the agent-structure debate has not always been appreciated. In fact, early research employing role theory often maintained a close connection to structural theories of international relations, especially among U.S.-based scholars.
In the last decade or so, there has been a renewed interest in role theory that differs from earlier work in that it more clearly connects with psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis. It also takes more seriously the domestic sources of role theory through inquiry into horizontal and vertical role contestation. Much of this new work intersects with constructivism, although it remains grounded in empiricism.
As foreign policy analysis increasingly seeks to understand the foreign policies of a broader array of states—including smaller states that face significant constraints on their ability to act in the international arena—role theory provides an attractive framework. Its focus on decision makers’ conceptions of their state’s role in international politics enhances the ability to make sense of the foreign policies of a wider array of states in the global arena. In essence, role theory allows foreign policy analysis to move beyond a U.S.-centric or global-north-centric field to become more broadly comparative.
We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.